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Anti-Partisan Warfare, Yugoslavia
Germany’s War Against Tito’s Partisans
303 pages; 19 chapters and 9 appendixes
There was something unwritten going on in the German high command during the
German anti-partisan war in Yugoslavia. Several excellent German and Axis
combat formations regularly made mincemeat of the communist partisans. Yet, no
coherent strategy was devised or implemented to defeat the communists, and the
communists were very defeatable. Anti-Partisan Warfare, Yugoslavia explains the
dark underbelly of the war, and attempts to answer the question: Why were the
Germans defeated there? Anti-Partisan Warfare, Yugoslavia provides clear and
definitive analysis of both Axis operations and the machinations of Tito’s partisans.
Anti-Partisan Warfare, Yugoslavia compares operational efficiency to the tactics
employed by several different groups of Axis combatants and their communist
adversaries. The answers to many questions about that war will shock you.
“The German Army's, 1st Cossack Division's, operational mission in the Balkans was to guard railway and road
connections between Agram and Belgrade as well as the long Adriatic Sea coastline in the Division's zone of operations.
The unit's tactical mission was to liberate the entire area that had heretofore been controlled by the Yugoslavian
partisans under the communist mass-murderer, Tito. At that time, Tito commanded twenty-six communist partisan
divisions totally 220,000 men. Within a short period of time, the 1st Cossack Division rapidly pacified the districts through
which the railroad ran.
For offensive operations, each Cossack division or regiment was usually reinforced with Croatian infantry. The attachment
of Croat infantry battalions, regiments, or brigades provided the Cossacks with a pinning force around which they could
The employment of the 1st Cossack Division in Yugoslavia was similar to the deployment of the US Army's 1st Cavalry
Division in Vietnam's Binh Dinh Province in the mid-1960s. The first Cossack divisional offensive assignment was a search
and destroy mission in a thirty kilometer by forty-kilometer section of the Fruska-Gora Mountains in early October 1943.
General von Pannwitz personally directed that operation from an aircraft overhead. The operation was a failure since the
partisans were forewarned of the operation. The division's subunits were also slow to respond to orders. In each Cossack
squad there were trained demolition specialists, proficient in setting explosive charges.”
Excerpt from Anti-Partisan Warfare, Yugoslavia
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