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D-Day Combat - German Army Counterattack
D-Day Combat
Invasion & German Counterattack
© 2010
307 pages; 18 chapters, 1 combat report, and 8 appendices
Of the 175 books currently available on D-Day, or the invasion of Normandy,
France in 1944
, none of them really go into deep detail about the German side of
that campaign
. None of the books explain how the German commanders, officers,
and units perceived the various situations and problems relevant to the invasion of
France, and how they dealt with them. Almost no books give complete descriptions
of the
German units that actually fought in the battles around Normandy, and
how they faired. In an ostentatious search for “bling” most writers about D-Day
grossly gloss over the most interesting aspects of that campaign. In answer to this
historical deficit, QuikManeuvers has brought forth
D-Day Combat.
D-Day Combat reports, from the German standpoint, the German Army’s reaction
to the invasion of France in 1944
, especially its numerous counterattacks.
There are many books on
D-Day fighting, but they merely skim the surface. D-Day
is an in depth series of reports by German Army officers who were
there in France in 1944
. They discuss German Army organization and reaction
to D Day
as only professional experts can do. Read D-Day Combat: Invasion and
German Counterattack
and learn about what happened in France in June 1944,
from several new angles.
Review Table of Contents
“The infantry employed as counterthrust reserve was too weak as to numbers, and had no heavy weapons. In bright
daylight, a displacement became impossible for them because of the enemy air activity. The tactics of Rommel-"Let all
weapons display their effect on the water"-might be correct; these weapons, however, ought to have been mounted in
"permanent battle installations" (concrete), and in far greater quantity than was the case in the sector of Bayeux. As here
an "Atlantic Wall" did not exist, there had to be at least some reserves in the rear. If this had not been the case, the
enemy might even on 6 June have succeeded in forming a major bridgehead at this coastal front, and in thrusting forward
from it.
The infantry employed as counterattack reserve (reinforced 915th Infantry Regiment), in my opinion, had taken the
decisive part in the engagements on 6 June. Standing "at the ready" on the right divisional wing, and having frequently
practiced an attack toward the northeast (Crepon), this reinforced regiment had to fall in-as ordered by Corps-first of all
toward the west. Apparently, the report "Air landings south of Carentan" had not been immediately verified, for it was
false! Now, the regiment was compelled to get over a distance of about eighty kilometers, twenty-five of which were to be
marched-widely spaced because of the enemy fighter-bombers which had already started their work-and with the
remaining fifty-five kilometers on bicycles or frequently breaking-down French motor vehicles. The enemy, moreover,
attacking from Crepon toward the south, got a start on the overtired 915th Regiment (and its counterattack), which just
arrived and was not ready for battle. If this unit had remained on the right divisional wing and from here fought the
counterattack toward Crepon in the early morning, the right flank of the 352nd Infantry Division would not have been
threatened by the enemy this day, and the withdrawing portions of the 716th Infantry Division would probably have been
supported. The 30th British Army Corps then would not have so easily achieved success again and again on 6 June, and
our own High Command would have arrived at different decisions.”
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Excerpt from D-Day Combat
D-Day Combat - German Army Counterattack and the Atlantic Wall