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French Indochina War, Fortifications - De Lattre Line Maneuver Hinge
French Indochina War, Fortifications
De Lattre Line Maneuver Hinge
© 2010
198 pages; 13 chapters
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French Indochina War, Fortifications. Although dozens of books
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First Indochina War, none of the so-called
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French aspect of that war
French Indochina War, Fortifications.
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French Indochina War,
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French Indochina War, Fortifications, by Breaker
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Review Table of Contents
“The communist enemy systematically attacked French posts during the night and, of course, by surprise. Under the
circumstances the resistance of a fortified post was naturally a function of the fortification's quality, but it was just as much
dependent upon the decisions, during the battle, of the command and the garrison itself.
French command authorities were required to assign to the fortified posts:

The armament allowance of a military post depended upon its strength or capacity for resistance as well as its importance
as protector of a key area or thoroughfare.”
Excerpt from French Indochina War, Fortifications
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French Indochina War, Fortifications - De Lattre Line Maneuver Hinge
  • Adequate personnel to not only permit sallies outside the post but also a suitable system of relief.
  • Ammunitions supplies adequate enough to sustain a long night battle. Experience taught the French to
    furnish each fortification with 3 to 4 units of fire (basic battle loads) and sometimes more. The actual
    allowance depended primarily on the French ability to resupply by surface transportation.
The subversion of certain regions was such that specific posts were only rarely supplied by land routes. They had
to depend upon airdrops. The same was true for food supplies, the volume of which varied with the degree of
isolation of the garrison.
  • Adequate support from the appropriately positioned supporting artillery and sometimes air of river firepower.