©2005-2006 QuikManeuvers. All Rights Reserved.
Hezbollah False Victory, Israel's Self Defeat
Hezbollah’s False Victory
Israel’s Raid Into Lebanon, 2006
© 2006
175 pages; 15 chapters
On September 11, 2006, the third anniversary of the mass murder of over 3,000 innocent
American civilians by
muslim terrorists, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) launched an
attack into Hezbollah-controlled southern Lebanon
. The Israelis had put up with
Hezbollah terrorists atrocities for too long and they wanted to kick the Iranian-
controlled terror group out of Lebanon for good. For about a month the fighting raged, with
a few thousand Hezbollah terrorists fighting one of the best armies in the world. However,
something was wrong with the Israelis. Years of
sabotage and subversion by leftists,
pro-muslim Israeli traitors had taken a toll on the Israeli Army’s will to fight
. Israeli
soldiers were indifferently led and their performance was more on the par of a muslim
army. As a result, the fighting was inconclusive and when the international leftist media and
the pro-muslim UN jumped in to protect the “poor innocent Hezbollah terrorists",
the Israeli
Army looked like a loser
. Now, the US media beat the drums for the great Hezbollah
victory.
Hezbollah’s False Victory is about Hezbollah’s military force and its one
month combat against the Israeli Army.
Hezbollah’s False Victory is also about Israel’s
self-defeat in Lebanon
. This book will shock you with its stunning facts and scathing
analysis. Israel is in trouble, learn why in
Hezbollah’s False Victory.
“Hezbollah tactics are crude. They are effective only if their opponent lacks will, power and or morale. Rather than have to
react faster than the IDF's decision cycle, they could largely ignore it, waiting out Israeli attacks, staying in positions,
reinfiltrating or reemerging from cover, and choosing the time to attack or ambush. Forward fighters could be left behind
or sacrificed, and "self-attrition" became a tactic substituting for speed of maneuver and the ability to anticipated IDF
movements.
The small gangs of Hezbollah terrorists were ordered to do as much damage as possible within their assigned areas.
They were told how to exfiltrate if the action got to hot and they were told to advance again if the Israelis stalled or
retreated. Since their actions didn’t have to be coordinated by flabby cowards worried about collateral damage, rules of
engagement or fire support, each Hezbollah fire team could operate on its own initiative. There are no conventional units
in the US or Israeli armies that are allowed to use their own initiative.”
Excerpt from Hezbollah’s False Victory
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Hezbollah's False Victory