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HUMINT - Principles of Human Intelligence
HUMINT
Principles of Human Intelligence
© 2007
207 pages; 20 chapters
HUMINT is a primer or guidebook on the skills of human intelligence collection or
obtaining information from people. The reader of
HUMINT, if he applies himself, will
become
more knowledgeable and skillful in HUMINT applications than most US
Army generals
. Although HUMINT is a national mandate, most professional soldiers
and intelligence operations, even in 2007, know little about it. The
principles of
human intelligence
described in HUMINT will wipe that deficit out. HUMINT includes
enough interesting concepts and facts to qualify the book as an excellent,
one-of-a-kind
guidebook to collecting information from people.  Human
intelligence collection methods
from the ancients to the modern day Israeli Army
are described with precision in
HUMINT.
“For over fifty years Western military forces have tolerated an abominable and criminal lack of strategic and operational
intelligence.  It would require a thick book just to describe what western intelligence never learned about, for instance, the
Soviet Army. British General Richard Simpkins revealed that the highly vaunted British intelligence apparatus, for
example, was never able to obtain even basic data about Soviet operations. General Simpkins credited a book of
reminiscences by a Soviet defector, Viktor Suvorov with a finding that British intelligence should have had already in hand.
"...Viktor Suvorov's first book...the description in it of the invasion of Czechoslovakia was the only one I could find of a
modern operational-level move, even on training; and this description gained progressively in credibility as I gleaned clues
from the major authorities and low-level material..."
During Operation Desert Storm, American combat units were not afforded sufficient combat intelligence support at either
the tactical or operational levels. The same mistakes have been continued in Afghanistan and Iraq, 2002-2007. The
failure of combat intelligence officers and resources may be attributed to several salient factors of long standing
significance which have brought about a crisis in American military intelligence.“
Excerpt from HUMINT
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Review Table of Contents
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INT
HUMINT - Principles of Human Intelligence
1990-2007 Deficits of American Military Intelligence
• Linear thinking which insists upon logical steps.
• Refusal to recognize the dominance, or influence, of combat asymmetry
• Distrust of human contributions and exaggerated admiration for machine/technological solutions.
• Focus upon capabilities over intentions
• Over-emphasis upon: terrain, linear warfare, attrition, the defensive, firepower, and the tactical level of war.
• Refusal of combat commanders to devote 30% or more of their combat assets to the reconnaissance struggle,
• Lack of professional scouts and reconnaissance officers
• No control of reconnaissance assets by intelligence officers
• Insufficient reconnaissance specialist units.
• Lack of fast, simple, workable combat intelligence system.
• Distrust of, or opposition to, maneuver and nonlinear warfare.
• An analyst system which is unsuited for combat operations.
• An intelligence that is too slow and dogmatic.
• Lack of a workable intelligence filtering system which separates the significant from the  irrelevant.
• A top-down intelligence system that emphases "eyes in the skies" over ground reconnaissance   at the unit level.
• Combat commander aversion to using reconnaissance and combat patrols because of the danger of casualties.
• Susceptibility to deception.
• A failure to understand and systemically integrate asymmetrical deployment relationships caused by enemy
reconnaissance, feints and forward detachments.
• A tendency to mirror-image US values onto enemies from diverse cultures.
• Deception is subordinated to operations, instead of intelligence.
• Focus upon the best solution to military problems in ignorance of the paradoxical solution which is not the best but is
unexpected.
• Reconnaissance-pull is not integrated into combat intelligence systems
• The Reconnaissance Battle is ignored.