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Korean War Combat: 1950-51
Korean War Combat: 1950-51
Korean War: Infantry Operations and Weapons
© 2009
335 pages; 22 chapters and 1 appendix
Korean War Combat: 1950-51 is an e-book written in large part by one of the very few
US military geniuses,
SLA Marshal. (Tactical comments are provided by Breaker
McCoy, ed.). Demonstrating a deep and precise understanding of the tactical level of
General SLA Marshal provides a most interesting, authentic and shocking
discussion of the
US Army in Korea War Combat, 1950-51. Marshal’s genius for war,
which afforded him a tremendously deep military frame of reference, was complemented
by an understanding of war, unconstrained by worries about careerism.
Korean War
Combat: 1950-51
will mesmerize the reader as he is led by a past master at war
through a very interesting series of fascinating lessons on US Army performance during
Korean War. Korean War Combat: 1950-51 will provide hours of interesting
military research for the reader who will view a series of facts about the
US Army’s
tactical performance that will shock you.
Review Table of Contents
“Conspicuously, in the Korean fighting, there is strong and clearly defined squad action compared to the general lack of it
in World War II engagements. That is partly due to the effect of the terrain. Because of the sharpness of the ridge crests
and the narrowness of the approaches, the company frequently must advance with a radically narrowed front sometimes
a squad or half a squad. In defense, the company perimeter may build up around several knobs on one hill, and the
separate squads in one platoon holding one particular knob may be facing and fighting in different directions. Troops
advance as squads. They retire as squads. They get cut off as squads. In the course of action, there is less scrambling of
the company than occurred in World War II engagements. (Such tactics can only lead to defeat in detail and SLAM is
wrong to glorify it. Suddenly US commanders began acting as if squads were viable maneuver units. That is a very serious
and amateurish mistake. In fact, commanders should never maneuver without an entire company and usually deploy an
entire battalion at once. American battalion commanders seem to always want to keep most of their battalion together in a
defensive position and maneuver one to two rifle companies in diverse missions during which they are not mutually
supporting. There are too many US battalion and company commanders that simply cannot command and maneuver a
complete battalion or company so they needlessly fragment it, which leads to defeat in detail. In fact the practice has
been on going on so long that many higher commanders even think in terms of moving companies. Such confusion
results from poor training and the lack of understanding of the importance of supporting arms and mass.)”
Excerpt from Korean War Combat: 1950-51
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Korean War Combat: 1950-51