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Scouts and Reconnaissance - Combat Reconnaissance
Scouts and Reconnaissance
Combat Reconnaissance Since 1914
© 2008
232 pages; 5 chapters and 1 appendix
Scouts and Reconnaissance is an e-book about combat reconnaissance
since 1914. The greatest weakness of
Scouts and Reconnaissance is that
the information that it offers is skewed through the prism of the oddly American
approach to war. Americans have never really appreciated the importance of
intelligence and reconnaissance, which is one explanation of American
Military Intelligence’s over a century-long record of ineptitude. After leftist
generals get through mangling the operations of
scouts and reconnaissance,
America’s leftist media and treason groups finish it off with cooked-up scandals
that lead to a complete hamstring of
intelligence and reconnaissance.
American traitors have been able to castrate the efforts of
American
intelligence and reconnaissance
for decades. Scouts and
Reconnaissance
reflects none of the above listed reality. The e-book
represents the efforts of one officer to direct more attention at
scouts and
reconnaissance
. The e-book is useful only as an example of American
thinking on the most important of subjects.
Review Table of Contents
"A good example of the clash between prewar expectations and real-war realities took place on 20 August 1914 at the
village of Hamipré near the town of Neufchâteau in the Belgian Ardennes. There, reconnaissance elements of the French
Fourth Army ran into the main body of the advancing German Fourth Army whose supporting reconnaissance elements
had previously passed through the area without encountering any northeast of Neufchâteau, in the first major Franco-
German clash in the Ardennes. While the French expected a German cavalry advance directly to the west, Richthofen’s
initial mission was to secure the area around the Meuse River crossings at Dinant, north of the Ardennes, to support the
projected advance of the German Third Army. For that reason, the cavalry in the Ardennes shifted to the northwest,
leaving the forested area centered on Neufchâteau devoid of German cavalry after 12 August. When the German Fourth
Army advanced toward Neufchâteau, it would have to depend on the cavalry regiments (US squadron-sized) attached to
its infantry divisions for reconnaissance support.
The German IV Cavalry Corps was south of the Ardennes. The corps started the war in southern Luxembourg and
northern Lorraine, supporting the eventual advance of the German Fifth Army in the general direction of Verdun. On the
day of the Battle of Hamipré, the northernmost positions of this corps were only a few miles south of the battlefield, and
although these horse soldiers observed the French advance, the information was not passed to the forces of the German
Fourth Army advancing directly toward the French.
In the opening weeks of the campaign, the German cavalry quickly discovered that mounted attacks against entrenched
enemy forces were unsuccessful. This resulted in operational-level intelligence consisting only of the results of such
actions. However, despite these deficiencies, the Germans successfully screened their infantry’s advance from the
French. Before 20 August, the French identified only the two divisions of the German I Cavalry Corps as being opposite
their forces in southern Belgium."
Excerpt from Scouts and Reconnaissance
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Scouts and Reconnaissance - Combat Reconnaissance