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Secrets of Stalingrad
How General Paulus Lost the War
454 pages; 22 chapters and 10 appendixes
For the first time since World War Two, a book is available that provides a
professional military analysis of why the Germans were defeated at Stalingrad.
Heretofore the Battle of Stalingrad has been depicted as a stupid battle where
Hitler’s interference and stupidity caused the destruction of the huge 6th Army.
That mindless mantra has been repeated endlessly as the explanation of what
happened during the World War Two Battle of Stalingrad. Books written on the
subject then recount the same details over and over, tossing in vivid descriptions
of the unfortunate Germans and “heroic” communist snipers.
The real story behind the Battle of Stalingrad has been entirely missed by
every American and British author of the past sixty years.
Secrets of Stalingrad has utilized over-looked German and Russian language
reports and maps to piece together a totally different story about what happened
at Stalingrad. Finally the Battle of Stalingrad is correctly explained. The
culpability of General Paulus and General Sedylitz, two closet German traitors,
is precisely defined. The deficiencies of German command along with specific acts
of sabotage are clearly explained and substantiated. Secrets of Stalingrad
reveals how General Paulus lost the Battle of Stalingrad and World War Two
“General Frederich von Paulus, commander of the German 6th Army, was trained and experienced as a staff officer. He
was not a good staff officer but he was well trained in logistics. However, he acted as if he knew nothing of logistics from
July through November 1942.
In the summer of 1942 Paulus advanced towards Stalingrad with 250,000 men, 500 tanks, 7,000 guns and mortars, and
25,000 horses. Progress was slow because fuel was rationed and Army Group A was given priority. At the end of July
1942, a lack of fuel brought Paulus to a halt at Kalach. It was not until 7th August, that he had received the supplies
needed to continue with his advance. Over the next few weeks his troops killed or captured 50,000 Soviet troops but on
18th August, Paulus, now only thirty-five miles from Stalingrad, ran out of fuel again. Thus Paulus knew that supply was a
problem for the 6th Army, but he made no special provisions for the solution of that problem. Neither had he prioritized
the fuel among specially organized assault groups. The art of improvisation was apparently unknown to Paulus.
When fresh supplies reached him, Paulus decided to preserve fuel by moving forward with only his 14th Panzer corps. In
late August, the Red Army now attacked the advance party and they were brought to a halt just short of Stalingrad. The
rest of his forces were brought up and Paulus deployed near the city. As his northern flank came under attack Paulus
decided to delay the attack.
On 23 August, the 6th Army was on the right bank of the Volga north of Stalingrad and moving into the suburbs. While
opposition from the Russian 62nd and 64th Armies in Stalingrad stiffened, Paulus gained control of the gap between the
Don and the Volga, established air and supply bases there and, on 2 September, made contact with Hoth. Paulus and
over 100 of his officers knew exactly how to calculate the food, fuel and ammunition expenditures of the 6th Army on a
daily basis and they knew how to project future needs by factoring in predictable shortages. However, Paulus and his
staff proved inept at such predictions and logistics planning seemed beyond them. In every way possible, Paulus proved
repeatedly that he was a military simpleton and unsuited for his high rank. That is undoubtedly why the nervous facial tic
first began to be noticed by his men in July 1942.”
Excerpt from Secrets of Stalingrad
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