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Special Operations 2007
Interviews with Special Forces Leaders
259 pages; 4 sections
Special Operations 2007 is a unique book of interviews that afford the
reader some surprising insights into how some US Army Special Forces
officers and sergeants think. The pride felt by those patriotic Americans
who recognize and understand the war fighting achievement of
America’s US Army Special Forces will be reinforced by
Special Operations 2007. Many interesting facts and unknown
operations of US Army Special Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq will
be better understood or first realized by reading Special Operations 2007.
However, there is also some cause to be concerned.
Conventional US Army generals have ordered US Army Special Forces
troops to train Afghanistan and Iraqi soldiers. That would be fine if the Special Forces trainers were not training the
muslim troops in America’s best warfighting skills and tricks. As a reader of Special Operations 2007 will rapidly discern,
some US Army Special Forces trainers are training Afghanistan and Iraqi units in the best Special Forces
warfighting skills, that is a major mistake because within a matter of a few short years those same Afghanistan and
Iraqi troops will be using what they learned against the USA !
“ ‘So I see that the biggest problem right now is we spend a lot of time kicking in doors, grabbing guys, but we only have a
certain amount of time before the national will falls away. SF could be providing a much greater role than just grabbing a
guy or killing a single guy out of a self-healing network. You’re slowly taking away from the enemy but you’re never really
doing any damage to him, versus raising an Iraqi indigenous force and crushing the whole insurgency. Another factor is
our lack of strategic and tactical patience. We’ve got to have enough patience to give SF guys time to train their
counterparts. SF guys inherently understand both points, but we too lack vision and patience. I know my colonel wanted
to bring it up, but he was faced with some other difficulties from the conventional guys, especially when the 4th ID rolled
in. Training was not what they were worried about. But at that time, I think it was, “Hey, if we could now glom on and start
training, we could raise the force and be ready.” And that would have been from day one, versus a year later when we
finally got the capability on the ground to start raising the forces. As to what SF’s role will be in the future, I think that’ll be
the most important thing.
You can’t expect to see Afghans running around doing things like infantry squads in the US Army because it’s just not
going to happen. They’re not at that point yet. There was a battalion commander who talked to a team one time and he
said, “Let’s not make these guys American soldiers. That’s not our job. We’re trying to train them to be soldiers. We’re
trying to train soldiers who don’t have any training at all.” If you could train them up to a 1940s or 1950s style military, isn’t
that good enough? Some people will say, “No, that’s not good enough. That wouldn’t work today.” Well, I don’t agree.
Look at the level of training for Al Qaeda and the Taliban. It’s not as sophisticated as ours. It’s better to train them to a
level where they can execute properly and do things right than trying to train them beyond their abilities, to a level where
they can’t execute at all. So if you look at it like that and you see them out doing training and you see them out doing
operations, they’re really not that bad. At least they all have their guns, the right gear and the right mentality.
Some SF guys have gone as far as having Ranger Handbooks interpreted into Pashto or Arabic and having copies
printed off to give to key leaders of their partner units. That’s an awesome idea. Another great idea is to have interpreters
translate the classes you want to formally give. Don’t just go into a unit, evaluate them as screwed up and say, “I can’t
believe my leadership is making me go to war with these damn people!” People with that attitude will never make that unit
any better. What US soldiers don’t understand, but what SOF does understand, is that what you have is all you have to
work with – and so you can either leave it like it is or you can make it as good as you can for your eight months. My
personality is that if you give me a piece of crap, I’m going to take all the time I can dedicate to fixing that piece of crap
and I’m going to make it into something useful. If nothing else, I’m going to make it better than it was when I found it, at
least for my own protection.’ “
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Excerpt from Special Operations 2007