|©2005-2009 QuikManeuvers. All Rights Reserved.
Stalingrad Secrets, After the Battle
281 pages; 16 chapters and 7 appendixes
There are many books about Stalingrad. They all share one salient failing.
They miss the mark entirely. The writers of the books, not being experienced
war fighting experts, do not understand the German Armed Forces, Soviet
Armed Forces, and the historical red flags that point like bloody arrows toward
historical truth. QuikManeuvers has produced several e-books about
Stalingrad that describe historical truths, ignored or unknown, by the
sheep-like historical commentators that wander in herds towards the dustbins of
history. Stalingrad was not only a battle, and a campaign, and a traitor-shaped
Armageddon, but it also left an indelible legacy.
Outside of Stalingrad, and after the Battle of Stalingrad was over, numerous
other battles were fought. Stalingrad Legacy: Stalingrad Secrets, After the
Battle describes aspects of the Stalingrad campaign and the battles that
were heavily influenced by it thereafter. Stalingrad was a huge mistake that set
off a chain reaction of mistakes. Stalingrad Legacy: Stalingrad Secrets,
After the Battle will reveal things to the reader that he never knew before.
“Knowing Hitler’s character, the German’s were never likely to withdraw and could be counted upon to conduct “a major
skillful counteroffensive, a counteroffensive ironically produced by Hitler’s insistence on forward defense blended with
Manstein’s insistence on operational maneuver.” However, the plans for such defenses and counter offensives that
Mainstein carried out were not sent back to Wehrmacht headquarters in Berlin. Therefore the Soviets did not have their
usual daily and hourly run down of German decisions and plans. If there had been no German traitors at the various
Wehrmacht headquarters in Berlin, the Germans would have easily won the war.
Several cardinal mistakes under laced the root of the Soviet operational defeat in the 1942-43 winter offensive.
Dominating Soviet mistakes was the sense of command bewilderment felt when the steady stream of Wehrmacht reports
relayed from German traitors became only tangentially useful because Mainstein was making his decisions on the spot.
The Soviet Army was totally dependent upon the spy reports they got every six to twelve hours. Without them, they were
Excerpt from Stalingrad Legacy
other books about German Army
other books about World War 2