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Military Intelligence Failure - US Army Military Intelligence Analysis
US Military Intelligence Failure
US Military Intelligence Collapse
© 2007
120 pages; 10 chapters and 3 appendixes
US Military Intelligence Failure describes not only the failure of US Army
Military Intelligence
, but also the failure of all well known US intelligence
agencies
to efficiently collect crucial information. In US Military Intelligence
Failure
the central thesis of American intelligence collection, analysis is
closely examined. There is no doubt that
intelligence analysis which is dominant
over
intelligence acquisition is a root cause of US Army Military Intelligence
failure
. The absurd American approach to intelligence analysis is totally
exposed in
US Military Intelligence Failure.
What no historian seems capable of answering or even addressing is the question,
“Why are Americans so inept at
collecting intelligence?” Why has the bizarre
collection of institutional
intelligence analysis and other fallacies dominated US
intelligence
for over six decades? If you are wondering just how bad US Army
Military Intelligence
is and why all US intelligence is so corruptly
incompetent
, then US Military Intelligence Failure is the book for you.
Review Table of Contents
“There is no doubt that traditionally the CIA has influence the upper echelon of US Army Military Intelligence in their
concept, training and operational use of “intelligence analysts.” That influence has only spread a dangerous bacilli of
incompetent cognition and execution.
Brigadier General Mohammed Yousaf, a member of Pakistan's Interservice Intelligence Agency, clearly described the fifty-
year old CIA Analysis problem in the late 1990s. "It was during this visit that my suspicions that the CIA gave undue weight
to the opinions of desk bound analysts were verified. Firstly (I was placed in a) conference room to be briefed on
Afghanistan. (I was being briefed by a female military analyst)...the woman was nervous and shaky, reading from her
notes-a sure way of alienating her audience, but a practice many Americans seemed to accept (although it indicated that)
the speaker has not mastered the subject. And so it proved on this occasion. When she had finished I asked what she
meant when she (opined that the) Mujahideen had suffered heavy casualties in a particular battle. What percentage did
she consider heavy, 10 percent, 20 percent or 50 percent? (She) immediately flummoxed. She was similarly confused
when I pressed her for the numbers who actually fought in the battle. Her male companions (then tried to) come to her
rescue. Later, I was told that she had been working on Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion and had obtained a Masters
Degree in (Military Affairs before) joining the CIA. Of course she had no practical experience of war, and never would
have. Without this experience, or first-hand knowledge of the battlefield, even the best analyst is apt to draw the wrong
conclusions from his facts and figures.
The next example involved a man considered to be an expert on Soviet tactics. After listening for awhile to his discourse
on what seemed to be an explanation of how the Red Army would advance across the north European plain, I queried the
relevance of what he had said to the terrain in Afghanistan. That (was the end of) him because he didn't speak again."
American analysts are not trained to have a framework of understanding concerning intelligence. Instead they are given a
tool kit of pseudo-scientific business-related methods that involve hypothesis testing in one form or another. In their
ignorance of the psychology of power* and of the enemy culture and language, they consider that
anything can happen
in every situation, and any interpretation is as possible as any other. Thus, in their ignorance they try to sift through a
massive flood of mostly inconsequential information which they then try to develop into scientific-appearing hypothesis
sets. Those sets are derived from biases obtained in higher education and reinforced by their specific agencies
institutional biases.”
Excerpt from US Military Intelligence Failure
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US Army Military Intelligence Failure